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A dictator game experiment and a questionnaire were used to gather information 
on redistributive preferences among a sample of South African university 
students. The questionnaire was used to gather data on the attitudes of 
individuals regarding redistribution, as well as their demographic details. The 
experiment used is known as the dictator game and it measures the altruistic 
motivations of the subjects involved. The complementary use of the dictator 
game and questionnaire provided incentive compatible information on the true 
preferences of the students for redistribution. The results indicate that only the 
status of the giver and the perceived worthiness of the recipient of redistribution 
significantly alter the giving behaviour of the “dictator”. Furthermore there is no 
correlation between those subjects who express a desire for redistribution and 





South Africa is a country of extraordinary income inequality, making the topic 
of redistribution from the rich to the poor both relevant and controversial. 
Debates over the extent of the redistributive policies continue to rage on in 
South Africa as problems such as rising unemployment, poverty and crime rates 
continue to rise unabated. While policy measures such as the old age pension 
scheme have been successful redistributive mechanisms, success in other areas 
(such as the redistribution of land) has not been promising. This slow pace of 
redistribution may hold some serious implications for the sustainability of 
democracy in South Africa. Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the opposition in 
Zimbabwe, argues in light of the Zimbabwean experience that in five or so years 
time, South Africans will be fed up with the lack of redistribution, pushing 
Mbeki to use the “race card” as a scapegoat for his government’s failings (Mail 
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How willing are South Africans to redistribute their income? Are attitudes 
toward redistribution are altered by either the status of the giver or the perceived 
worthiness of the recipient?  Understanding how willing South Africans are to 
accept greater redistributive measures is an important issue in the design of anti-
poverty and welfare policies that aim to redress inequalities. 
 
Typically, surveys are used to analyse people’s attitudes on redistribution or any 
other host of problems. While surveys are useful at collecting large amounts of 
information from large numbers of heterogeneous individuals, they suffer from 
incentive compatibility problems. Not only might individuals have an incentive 
to misreport, but they may answer in the way that they think the interviewer 
would like them to answer (Carpenter, 2000). More importantly, there may be a 
disjuncture between what individuals say they believe and what they actually do 
in practice. This is particularly important in studies concerning redistributive 
preferences as individuals who express a preference for greater redistribution 
and willingness to contribute towards redistribution programmes may not in fact 
follow this through in their actions. Carpenter (2000) therefore suggests that 
economic experiments be used as a complementary method to verify survey-
based results.  This is the approach adopted in this paper. 
 
A dictator game experiment and a questionnaire were used to gather information 
on redistributive preferences among a sample of South African university 
students. The questionnaire was used to gather data on the students’ attitudes 
regarding redistribution, as well as their demographic details. The experiment 
used is known as the dictator game.  It measures the altruistic motivations of the 
subjects involved.  In the dictator game two anonymous players are paired with 
each other. One player (Player A) is the “dictator” and is given a monetary 
endowment to split with the other player (Player B).  The second player cannot 
reject this offer and the game is not repeated.  The game theoretic prediction of 
the experiment is simple: the dictator should give nothing.  As there are no 
strategic considerations to the game, the only plausible motivation for giving 
something (i.e. any non-zero amount) must be pure altruism (Eckel et al., 1996). 
As the experimental subjects have the opportunity to earn real money, 
individuals have an incentive to reveal their true preferences. The link between 
altruism and redistribution is that voluntary redistribution can be seen as an 
altruistic move similar to that in the dictator game.  The complementary use of 
surveys and experiments allows an examination of whether there is a correlation 
between those who express a desire for redistribution in the survey and those 





A total of 153 students were recruited at the University of Cape Town (UCT), 
through posters, leaflets and e-mail correspondence.  Each student was given a 
participation fee of R20 (to compensate them at an equivalent rate to the 
opportunity cost of the time they spent participating).  Each “dictator” was given 
an endowment of R40 that he or she could then choose to re-allocate.  The sum 
of R40 was chosen because this approximates what an undergraduate student is 
likely to earn in two hours of work.  Funding for the experiments was provided 
by the UCT Faculty of Commerce. 
 
The demographic profile of the student participants is a fair indication of a 
typical university student population in South Africa.  The average age of the 
participants was approximately twenty years.  The sex of the participants was 
reasonably well divided between men and women (with 57% women and 43% 
men). Just over one-third (37%) were African, about the same proportion (35%) 
were white, 20 percent were coloured and 8% Asian or Indian.  Participants 
were spread across all of the major undergraduate degrees: B.Sc. (14%), B.A. 
(18%), B.Com. (26%), B.Soc.Sci. (23%) and B.Bus.Sci. (13%).   
 
Experiments generally use university students as subjects.  The reasons for this 
are simple: students usually make up a good cross-section of the population; 
their time is flexible; monetary incentives for participation are lower in 
comparison to professionals; and they are easy to recruit as they all rotate 
around a small space.  But in a developing country such as South Africa, using 
students can be a problem as they most likely come from the “upper crust” of 
society and are generally wealthier than your average population. Another 
problem with using students is that, due to their age and lack of experience in 
solving real social dilemmas, they may lack the external validity to extrapolate 
their results (Carpenter, 2001).  The majority of students most likely have not 
ever earned their own money or had to pay income tax, therefore making the 
question of redistribution less relevant to them.  Although it is standard practice 
to use university students in experiments, the fact that they are not representative 
of the overall population means that caution should be exercised when 
interpreting the results. 
 
 
Attitudes towards Redistribution 
 
The questionnaire that the experimental subjects answered was detailed and 
included questions regarding their demographic details, their attitude towards 
redistribution, and their attitudes towards the experiment itself (see Appendix  
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for the questionnaire). The students completed the questionnaire immediately 
after the experiment.  This is standard practice and the students had not been 
told at any stage what the experiment was about.  It might have been better to 
administer the questionnaire several weeks before the experiment, but this was 
logistically impossible.  The problem with asking experimental subjects to 
answer a questionnaire after an experiment is that they may have been 
influenced in some way by the experiment and therefore their survey results may 
be biased.  To test if this is indeed the case, the responses of Player As can be 
compared with the responses of the Player Bs.  This comparison revealed that 
the Player As and Bs held, on average, similar opinions on redistribution.  It can 
therefore be concluded that the survey results are valid.  
 
The students were questioned as to their awareness of the problem of income 
inequality in South Africa.  Just over two fifths of the students were not all that 
concerned with this issue, agreeing that ‘there will always be the rich and the 
poor in any society, and South Africa is no different’.  Almost half of the 
respondents answered that ‘South Africa has one of the worst income inequality 
problems in the world, which is something that should be dealt with urgently’.  
There was no significant difference in the perception about income inequality 
across race groups.  But richer individuals perceived income inequality to be 
less of a problem than poorer individuals.1  This is expected, as richer subjects 
would most likely be more sheltered from the effects of widespread poverty. 
 
Students were asked if the progressive tax system was a fair system for 
redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor (see Figure 1).  Of the total 
number of respondents almost two thirds answered that it was a fair method of 
redistribution.  Women, on average, are less in favour of the progressive tax 
system than men are. The poorer students were more in favour of the 
progressive tax system and for the distribution of wealth being more evenly 
spread than the wealthier students.  In addition, over two thirds of the students 
answered that “the money and wealth (of South Africa) should be more evenly 
distributed among a larger percentage of the people”.  These two questions 
together provide evidence that these participants were aware of the problem of 
income inequality and are not averse to mechanisms such as the progressive tax 
system being used for redress. Furthermore there is a significant correlation (at 
the 0.01 level) between the two results from those respondents that were in 
favour of redistribution. This implies that the respondents were answering the 
questionnaires in a consistent manner.  




Figure 1: Attitudes toward Inequality and Redistribution 
 
14. The Progressive tax system (i.e. a system of tax where richer individuals are taxed more than
poorer individuals through tax brackets) is seen as one method of redistributing wealth from the rich
to the poor. How fair do you believe this system to be?  
fair 63%  unfair 26%  Don’t know/have no opinion 9% 
 
16. How well do you think the government is dealing with income inequality? 
The government is doing very well, they are closing the gap between the rich and poor quite quickly
           0% 
The government is working hard on the problem, it just needs time and patience  48% 
The government has been completely ineffective in solving the income inequality proble 37% 
I don’t have an opinion on this issue       15% 
 
17. Do you think that the South African government should help the poor, or do you think it is up to
the poor to help themselves? 
Poor should help themselves 16%  Government should help the poor 72% 
Don’t know   7%  Don’t care    6% 
 
19. Do you think that the distribution of money and wealth in South Africa today is fair, or do you
think that the money and wealth in South Africa should be more evenly distributed among a larger
percentage of the people? 
The current distribution of money and wealth is fair 10%  Don’t know 22% 
The wealth and money should be more evenly distributed among a larger percentage of people  69%
 
20. Which one of the views expressed below do you most agree with? 
There is plenty of opportunity in South Africa, and anyone who works hard can get far 61% 
There is not much opportunity in South Africa, and the average person doesn’t have much chance to
get far even if they work hard        39% 
 
21. South Africa is sometimes described as a country of “haves” (people who have money and live
well) and “have-nots” (people who are poor and struggle for the basic necessities in life).  Which of
the following groups do you think you’re in? 
Haves  50%  Have-nots 16% 
Neither  26%  Don’t know 7% 
 
23. Do you think the same situation of “land-grabbing” will arise in South Africa in the near future?
Not at all likely  2%  It is a  possibility that should not be ignored 57% 
Very likely  8%  I don’t know     11% 
 
 
24. If you had the opportunity to uplift a family that you have never seen or known by sacrificing
some of your present/future income, would you do it? 
Only if I knew that the family was deserving of charity  57% 
Only if it was a small proportion of my total income  8% 
I would willingly give money to uplift others   25%  
I would never give money to people I do not know  3% 
I don’t have an opinion on this issue    7% 
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Students were asked if they would be willing to give money to an anonymous 
family.  Most of the respondents answered that they would give money to a 
family only if the family was deserving of charity.  Almost a quarter of the 
students said that they would willingly give their money away even though they 
did not know anything about the circumstances of the family.  This is the first 
confirmation of the fact that people may be more willing to give money away 
when they feel that the recipient is deserving.  This theme will be explored later 
in the discussion of the experimental results. 
 
On the issue of who should bear the responsibility for redistribution, government 
was seen as having the greatest responsibility for helping the poor (45% of the 
respondents). Moreover, when given a choice between the poor helping 
themselves and the government helping the poor, 72% of the respondents 
answered that the government should help the poor.  Yet, when they were asked 
how well they felt the government was dealing with income inequality no one 
answered that the government was doing very well.  Just under half of the 
respondents had faith in the government, and believed that they were working 
on the problem, which requires patience, while 37% of the students felt that the 
government had been completely ineffective thus far in reducing income 
inequality.  More of the white students felt that the government had been 
completely ineffective in redressing inequality as compared to students from 
other race groups.  
 
Finally, over 60% of the students felt that there was plenty of opportunity 
available in South Africa for those who were willing to work hard. The split by 
race revealed that African students were the most pessimistic about 
opportunities while white students were the most optimistic (although this 
difference was not significant).  The male subjects were far more optimistic than 
the female subjects.  Richer students were, as expected, more optimistic about 
opportunities than poorer students (see Table 1).  
 






























The results of the survey indicate that the majority of the subjects are in favour 
of redistribution and they are aware of the problem of income inequality. They 
feel that government should be largely responsible for the role of redistribution 
although none of the subjects believed that the government had done a good job 
of it to date. Most of the student subjects felt that there was opportunity in South 





Individuals’ responses in surveys may differ from how they actually behave in 
real life.  Experiments can be used as a complementary method of extracting 
incentive compatible information regarding people’s attitudes towards 
redistribution.  Nevertheless, an experiment, by itself, can have little explanatory 
power if unaccompanied by a questionnaire.  It is through using complementary 
surveys and experiments that we can develop powerful explanations of social 
behaviour.   
 
Our experiments focused on altruism.  Altruism can be defined as the ‘regard for 
others as a principle of action’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, p.35).   For Eckel, 
‘altruism is a motivating factor in human behaviour in general and dictator 
games in particular’ (Eckel, 1996). 
 
Before outlining the experimental protocol used in this project, it is worth 
addressing the validity of the experimental results. It could be argued that 
experiments are highly unlikely events that an individual will most probably 
never repeat again. How can an experiment draw behavioural parallels with the 
real world?  Gintis (2000) argues that people assign these improbable situations 
into a context that they can understand.  They therefore place the experiment 
into a high-probability event and behave accordingly.  Consequently if 
economic agents have social preferences, i.e. they have stable preferences for 
how money is allocated, and if evolution has indeed created cognitive heuristics 
for playing games, then social norms should enforce those heuristics and thus 
simulate a sterilised real world (Camerer & Fehr, 2000).  Games are, of course, 
enormous simplifications of social phenomena, but they may be able to isolate 
specific social behaviour that is motivated by material payoffs.  They can also be 
used to test different treatment effects, i.e. if one alteration is made in the 
experiment, for example communication is allowed, then the experiment is 
isolating that effect with respect to the control group.  The advantage of 
experiments is that they are easily replicable and comparable.  Furthermore, the 
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subjects are given incentives to take the experiment seriously and to make 
truthful decisions.  However because experiments are such simplifications of the 
real world, it is not advisable to generalise the results of an experiment to actual 
social phenomena. 
 
The dictator game was designed to isolate altruistic motivations.  One player is 
the “dictator” and is given a monetary endowment to split with the other player. 
The second player cannot reject this offer and the game is not repeated. The 
game theoretic prediction of the experiment is that dictator should give nothing. 
If altruism exists and if people do care about others purely as a reflex action, 
then there may be a future for more expansive redistributive policies. 
Generalised results from around the world indicate that approximately 80% of 
the dictators send a positive amount through to their recipients, with 
approximately 20% giving away half of the pie (Rigdon, 2002).  It was therefore 
proposed that people do have altruistic motivations and are willing to help out 
others with no benefit to themselves.  
 
 












Treatment Single-blind Double-blind Double-blind Red Cross 
Average 
allocation 
23% 9% 11% 30% 
Modes 0%, 30% 0%  0%, 20%, 
50% 
Source: Carpenter, 2000. 
 
Important experimental results from dictator games are summarised in Table 2.  
The mean offers are consistently greater than zero, but the offers are very 
sensitive to ‘framing effects’.  The original dictator game was run by Forsythe et 
al. (1994), utilising a single-blind protocol – i.e. the dictator is completely 
anonymous to the recipient.  The results of this experiment indicated that 
altruism was a motivating factor in human psychology and the neo-classical 
model of self-interested agents was flawed.  In this experiment, dictators on 
average sent 23% of their endowments.  By way of contrast, in a dictator game 
utilising a double-blind treatment – i.e. where the dictator is anonymous to both 
the recipient and the experimenter – the average allocations dropped to 9%.  




                                          
social standing when deciding on how much to send.  As Forsythe et al. (1994) 
had used a single-blind treatment, Hoffman et al. (1994) maintained that the 
dictators were observed by the experimenters or subject to the “experimenter 
effect” (Eckel, 1996b) and this altered their behaviour.  In other words, their 
behaviour may be due to concern over what the experimenter might think of 
them and not altruism per se.  Hoffman et al. performed double blind dictator 
experiments, showing that when the subjects were completely anonymous, their 
offers fell.  This suggested that the double-blind treatment is the correct 
approximation of self-interested behaviour.  This result was verified by Eckel 
and Grossman (1996) in a similar double-blind treatment.2  This implies that in 
conditions of relative anonymity, akin to many market transactions, individuals 
may be inclined to behave more selfishly.  
 
However, Frohlich et al. (2000) proposed that the high degree of anonymity in 
the double-blind treatment might have a cost of its own: doubt. If the subjects in 
the game doubt the existence of their partners, then they may behave more 
selfishly than they would have otherwise. Furthermore, if the experiment is 
perceived as a game, then the dictators would be behaving competitively, i.e. 
winning through maximisation of their own welfare. Frohlich et al. ran the 
dictator game with two treatments: the first was the typical dictator game where 
the players are pre-assigned to rooms and they never see their partners; the 
second is where the subjects are all in one room, and therefore any doubt that 
their partners’ exist should be erased. The results of the experiment were as 
hypothesised: those who doubted the experiment less, gave more; and those who 
were less oriented towards the experiment as a game, gave more. Frohlich et al. 
(2000) maintained that once the experimenter effect and all social context is 
removed from the experiment, doubt arises in the minds of the dictators, and 
therefore the idea that double-blind dictators measures the true level of self-
interest, may be flawed.  
 
In addition, the experiments run by Bolton et al. (1995) refuted the significance 
of the “experimenter effect”.  They found that of the potential sources for the 
variation in the distributions of dictator games, only the ‘game frame’ – i.e. the 
manner in which the game is described – was significant.  They argued that the 
main reasons behind the difference in results was simply because the 
7 The dictators received an envelope with ten slips of paper and ten one dollar bills. The 
dictators had to remove ten slips from the envelope and the recipient in the other room would 
always receive an envelope with ten slips in it, whether it was money or paper. This ensures 
that the dictator is completely anonymous to any observation and therefore should not be 
affected by social standing considerations. 
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experimenters used words such as “provisionally allocated to each pair” in the 
experiment (Forsythe et al., 1994) or the experiment is described as a market 
transaction (Hoffman et al., 1994). These differences are more likely to affect 
the outcome of the dictator game than the experimenter effect. In short, the 
dictator game is very sensitive to framing effects and that the experimenter 
effect is not a cause for concern in these experiments. 
 
While the dictator game is very susceptible to framing effects, this also means 
that the game can easily be transformed so as to produce an isolated effect.  One 
of the uses of the dictator game is that one may be able to study the changes in 
behaviour with the changes in the status of the subjects.  By simply altering the 
information that the dictator receives about their partner, or by changing the 
method of assigning dictators, the effect of status on the game may be dramatic.  
There are certain instances of social interaction that are not anonymous and 
where behaviour is affected by context.  To illustrate this, Eckel and Grossman 
(1996) used a second treatment with their double-blind experiment.  They 
altered the game frame slightly by informing the dictators that they were sending 
the money to the Red Cross instead of a randomly chosen person in the next 
room.  In the anonymous treatment the subjects donated an average of 11% of 
their $10 pie while in the Red Cross treatment the subjects donated and average 
of 31% of their $10 pie.  The difference between the treatments was statistically 
significant, indicating that if the subjects believe that their recipient is somehow 
“deserving” then it alters their behaviour significantly.  Thus context does 
matter: knowing something about the agent with whom one is interacting affects 
one’s behaviour. 
 
Following on this result, Eckel et al. (2001) designed a market-style dictator 
game where players are assigned roles randomly or through their performance 
on a trivia quiz.  Their experimental hypothesis was that: ‘In markets where 
sellers have higher status, the distribution of equilibrium prices will be higher 
than in markets where buyers have higher status’ (ibid).  Status is a subjective 
good: people rank each other on different score sheets.  Therefore in order to 
simulate a consistent status effect, the status must be easily understandable and 
emphasised, as well as transparent.  In Eckel et al.’s (2001) experiment, the 
subjects wrote a trivia quiz on five obscure economic questions and status was 
assigned based on supposed performance in this quiz.   The subjects were told 




                                          
stars and earn the right to be dictators, whilst those who performed poorly on the 
quiz were assigned the role of Player B.  In fact, the assignment was random.3  
 
Their use of a competitive model instead of a bargaining experiment should 
discipline the subjects to behave in a rational manner, and remove all other 
individual oddities or noise from the experiment.  Eckel et al. (2001) find that 
status, i.e. a social, hierarchal ranking that entitles a person to special resources, 
has a significant effect on the earnings of the players and that status may 
subsequently have real effects in other situations.  Their results find that the 
mean earnings for the high-status subjects exceed those for the low-status 
subjects, and that this result is significant.  However, the effect of awarded status 
is not significantly different from randomly assigned status.  This may be due to 
either the effect of the lack of conviction on the parts of the subjects of the 
awarded status method or due to the fact that status is important, but people do 
not care how it was obtained.  
 
Further experiments performed by Eckel et al. (2001) found that for a status to 
be effective it should be publicly announced to both the lower and higher-status 
subjects. In their experiments a lot of fuss was made of the dictators, they were 
treated differently to the Player Bs and their success on scoring well on the quiz 
was heavily congratulated upon, with clapping and cheering. Therefore for 
status to be effective, not only do the higher-status individuals have to be told 
that they were more successful in the quiz, but they need to feel somewhat 
superior to their Player Bs through the reactions of others to their success. 
 
Clearly status, i.e. induced status, matters. But even naturally occurring status 
such as gender can affect behaviour.  Eckel et al. (2001) found that men earned 
more of the surplus and that men were significantly more aggressive in attaining 
the surplus than women throughout the sessions.  Therefore this is further proof 
that status has an effect on economic outcomes. 
 
Eckel et al. (1998) also examined the effects of gender in a double-blind dictator 
game.  They maintained that women are more “socially-oriented” and that men 
are more “individually-oriented”.  This implies that women are more selfless or 
10 The subjects must believe that the status was truly earned.  For instance, if some subjects were only guessing 
and they were still awarded the gold star, this may affect their belief about the assignment of status and hence 
their behaviour.  Furthermore, the quizzes were taken out of the room to be marked. This may further add to the 
suspicion that the quizzes were fixed.  Therefore the method of assigning gold stars may produce a significant 
effect on the behaviour of the players; this may be more pronounced if the process is more transparent.  In the 
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less selfish than men, and that therefore altruistic principles would be stronger in 
women than in men.  Their results confirm this with women giving, on average, 
almost double of what men give ($1.60 versus $0.82 out of a $10 pie).  
However, the double-blind experiment may be somewhat flawed despite their 
efforts to control for environmental factors.  As the experiment was double-
blind, in each individual treatment, all the player As were either men or women.  
Therefore the “dictators” may have suspected that all of the other players were 
also of the same sex.  As Dufwenburg et al. (2002) have shown, women are 
more willing to give to other women than men (solidarity).  Furthermore men 
act chivalrously and give more to women than to men.  Therefore if the subjects 
were suspicious of the experimental design and believed that they were paired 
with someone of their own gender, this may sway the results.  In other words, 
women may not be as generous as the results suggest.  However, Dufwenberg et 
al. (2002) did find that men are significantly more likely to give zero than 
women.  Therefore it may be advisable to gather demographic data from your 
subjects after the experiment rather than allowing for possible doubt to affect 
your experimental design.  Otherwise the subjects should answer a questionnaire 
as to their beliefs about the experimental design so as to filter out the doubters. 
 
 
The Experimental Results 
 
The purpose of this research is to understand redistributive preferences. The 
anonymous dictator game, as described above, was used in order to examine the 
altruistic principles of the subjects.  In addition to this, two other treatments 
were used to analyse the effects of different status effects. 
 
Camerer and Fehr (2001) suggest the mathematical formulation for the dictator 
game.  In this two-player game players are assumed to prefer more money to 
less, yet they are also income inequality averse, and thus they wish allocations to 
be equal.  The goals of the players are formalised as such: Let xi denote the 
material payoff to player i (the dictator in the dictator game), and xj the material 
payoff to player j (the recipient of the dictator’s offer).  Then the utility of player 
i is given as:  
 
Ui(x) = xi – β(xi – xj) 
 
where β measure how much player i dislikes income inequality. When β is zero, 




allocation occurs in the dictator game when player i has a positive β (based on 
guilt or fairness principles). However two other effects on the utility of player i 
are explored in this research, namely the status of the dictator and the status of 
the recipient. Therefore the above mathematical formulation is altered as such:  
 
Ui(x) = Sixi – β(xi – xj)sj  
 
where Si is the status of player i and sj is the status of player j. Therefore if 
player i is assigned some form of status (i.e. Si) then this increases the 
motivation of player i to be selfish, or alternatively to place more weight on 
player i’s own material payoff in the calculation of player i’s utility. The use of 
sj increases the willingness of player i to give to player j when the status of 
player j is accentuated. It is assumed that S,s ≥ 1.  
 
The calculation of the partial derivatives of the above equation reveals the 
hypothesised relationships: 
 
∂Ui/∂xi = Si – βsj > 0 
 
Therefore if Si increases (i.e. the status of the dictator is accentuated) holding all 
else constant, then the marginal utility with respect to player i’s endowment 
increases. This is consistent with the experimental results obtained by Eckel 
(2001) in her experiments, as discussed above, as the dictator would derive 
incrementally more utility from his/her endowment if he/she felt that it was 
earned. The above relationship also shows that if sj is increased then the 
marginal utility derived from an additional unit of money falls. Therefore if the 
neediness of player j is emphasised, then guilt or some other social norm will 
decrease Player i’s marginal utility from another unit of his/her own endowment.  
Furthermore as 0≤ β <1, if both Si and sj effects are induced in an experimental 
setting, it could be assumed that the effect of Si would be stronger on the 
marginal utility of player i. The calculation of the partial derivative of the utility 
of player i with respect to the endowment of player j reveals the following 
relationship: 
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Therefore if the status of player j is communicated to player i (i.e. to be a 
relatively more needy person) then the marginal utility of the dictator with 
respect to the recipient’s endowment increases. Therefore the dictator will derive 
positive marginal utility from an incremental increase in the endowment of 
his/her recipient. The equations derived above will be examined in the rest of 
this research to investigate if the hypothesised relationships do in fact exist. 
 
 
Treatment 1: Anonymous and Random 
 
The students were asked to all meet in one venue.  Once they had all signed their 
consent forms and been assigned their player identification numbers, students 
were randomly chosen from the crowd and asked to move to another venue. The 
students were given player identification numbers so that their anonymity was 
assured and so their offers and answers to their questionnaires could be tracked.  
In separate venues, the students were informed of their status in the experiment 
as either Player A or Player B.  They were all told that in addition to their R20 
show-up fee, the Player As had been given R40.  The Player As were asked to 
decide whether they wanted to give any of their R40 endowment to their 
anonymous Player B in the next room, and if so, how much (offers could range 
from 0 to R40).  They wrote down how much they were willing to offer on a 
sheet that recorded their player identification number and another sheet that 
simply recorded their offer amount.  The anonymous slip of paper was sent to 
the Player B’s and randomly distributed while the other sheet was used to record 
their offer amount and their player identification number.  Once the Player Bs 
had received their offers all the students were asked to fill out a questionnaire, 
and on the completion of the questionnaires, they were all paid their 
experimental earnings.  
 
 
Treatment 2: Status effect 
 
Following the design used by Eckel and Grossman (2001), the effect of status on 
the altruistic motivations of the subjects was induced through the use of a 
general knowledge quiz.  All the subjects were requested to answer a short quiz 
at the beginning of the experiment.4  The subjects were told that the results of 
the quiz would determine their status in the game as either Player A or Player B, 
13 The questions asked in the quiz were as follows: How many players are there in a water polo team? What is 
South Africa’s current inflation rate? How many oceans are there? How many official South African languages 




although in fact they were randomly assigned.  Those who scored the best on the 
quiz were told they had “earned” the right to be Player A.  These Player A 
students were applauded and congratulated on their success and repeatedly told 
they had earned their status as Player A.  This was a deliberate act intended to 
induce a status effect with Player As being seen as privileged.  It was 
hypothesised that the status treatments would provoke more selfish giving by the 
dictators in comparison to the random treatment.  
 
 
Treatment 3: Financial Aid students 
 
The third treatment entailed giving the dictators information about their Player 
Bs.  They were told that the recipient of their offer was a student on financial aid 
(which was in fact true).  It was hypothesised that the giving of the dictators 
would be more generous if they felt that their partner was “needy”. 
 
 
Experimental Results According to Treatment 
 
The histogram of the offer amounts and the means of the three treatment offers 
are shown below. Table 3 shows that average offers differed across treatments. 
As hypothesised, mean offers were higher in the financial aid treatment and 
lowest in the status treatment. 
 
 
Table 3: Treatment means (Offer amount) 
 
Treatment  Mean N Std. Deviation
Anonymous 13.4 25 11.1
Status 7.5 26 6.5
Financial aid 17.5 28 9.1
Total 12.9 795 9.9
 
Using ANOVA there is a significant difference between these treatment means 
at the 1% level (see Appendix A, Table 5).  The Mann-Whitney test, a non-
parametric test, was used to see if the treatments were significantly different to 
the control treatment (see Appendix A, Tables 6 and 7).  The difference between 
the status treatment and the control group was significant at the 5% level and the 
                                          
15 The total number of participants in the experiments was 153, however as only 79 of them 
were dictators, it is their data that is relevant for this research. 
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difference between the financial aid and control group was significant at the 
15% level.  Changing the frame of the dictator experiments has a significant 
effect on the behaviour of the Player As.  This result indicates that status has a 
negative effect on the altruistic motivations of the subjects.  If the neediness of 
their recipient is accentuated, however, then the Player As prove to be more 
forthcoming in their generosity. 
 
 




















































                                          
 
Histogram plots of the actual offers made in each treatment group also provide 
some interesting insights into the distribution of actual offers.  In the anonymous 
treatment almost a quarter of dictators were motivated into giving half of their 
pie, with only six subjects behaving like Homo Economicus and giving zero.  
By way of contrast, in the status treatment, modal offers occur at zero and R10, 
with only two dictators making equal splits.  Subjects appear to behave far more 
selfishly, on average, when they believed that they have earned the right to their 
resources.  Finally, the histogram from the financial aid treatment clearly shows 
how the perceived need of the recipient increases the generosity of the subjects.6  
Not only were one third of the dictators willing to give half of their money 
away, but six subjects felt it was necessary to give more than half away to help 
out their fellow students.  In general then, it appears that status does affect 
redistributive behaviour.  Individuals exhibited a willingness to redistribute their 
resources to others whom they perceived as needy, but this motivation is 
suppressed when the individual feels they have somehow earned the right to 
their resources (in this case through a supposedly good performance on a quiz). 
 
In each treatment group, the dictators were asked why they gave the amount 
they did.  This was an attempt to see if they were aware of their own motivations 
for their altruistic behaviour.  The most common reason given was that they 
“wanted to be fair”.  The second most common reason was that they felt they 
needed to help out their Player Bs, i.e. this is a direct altruistic motivation.  
 
 
The Effects of Demographic Variables 
 
Initial analysis of offers by demographic variables such as age, race and gender 
suggest that offers by age and gender are not significant, but offers by race are. 
Women in the sample made lower offers than men: the mean for women was 
R11.77 (with a standard deviation of 7.82), compared to a mean of R14.65 (and 
a standard deviation of 12.30) for men.  This contradicts the 1998 Eckel results.  
But this difference is not significant at the 10% level, using ANOVA (see 
Appendix A, Table 8).  There was a significant difference between the mean 
6 One of the financial aid treatments was significantly larger than the other financial aid 
treatment. It was thought that this might skew the results as the subjects are more likely to feel 
anonymous in a large group and therefore behave more selfishly. However the analysis shows 
that group size has no effect on the average giving behaviour of the subjects and if anything 
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offers by race group at the 10% level, using ANOVA (see Appendix A, Table 
10), but the significance of this result must be qualified because the removal of 
the highly variable Indian group renders the difference between the means no 
longer significant.  This result implies overall that a) men and women in this 
sample are not that different from each other in their altruistic motivations and 
b) that racial ties do not alter altruistic behaviour significantly, in this sample. 
 
The subjects were also asked to rank themselves into different income groups 
based on their perceived affluence.  While this ranking is highly subjective and 
may not be an accurate representation of actual affluence, it is hypothesised that 
those who perceive themselves to be rich will be more likely to give more whilst 
those who perceive themselves to be poorer will give less, due to the 
diminishing marginal utility of money theorem.  The difference in means 
between the income groups is significant, using ANOVA, at the 5% level (see 
Appendix A, Table 11).  However, once the handful of “rich” students are 
removed from the sample, the ANOVA result is insignificant.  The means are 
shown in Table 4 below.  Evidence for the diminishing marginal utility of 
money is mixed here. This may be due to the aforementioned problem with 
measuring the income of students. 
 
Table 4: Income Group Means (Offer amount) 
  
Financial situation7 Mean N Std. Deviation
Upper income 15.26 19 10.34
Middle income 12.60 42 9.56
Lower income 17.00 10 9.19
Poor 4.00 5 5.48
Total 12.90 79 9.85
 
Finally, neither the students’ home language nor religious affiliation (see 
Appendix A, Tables 12 and 13).  Commerce students gave slightly less than 
non-commerce students – with mean offers of R12.17 and R13.35 respectively – 
but the difference was not significant (see Appendix A, Table 14). 
 
 
                                          
18 The sample of “rich” students was very small and thus their experimental results have been 





Correlations between Experimental and Survey 
Results 
 
The experimental results seem to indicate that the conventional demographic 
variables such as gender, race, language or religion are not particularly good 
predictors of behaviour in this experimental setting.  The only significant 
predictors of behaviour appear to be the treatment group and status effects.  
Thus the correlation between participants’ behaviour in the experiments and 
their survey responses was examined.  The correlation between those who said 
they would willingly give money to uplift others and their actual offers in the 
experiment was low and insignificant (see Appendix A, Table 15).  Despite the 
survey results indicating that the majority of participants favoured redistribution, 
those who profess this aversion to inequality are not actually willing to carry out 
their own form of redistribution when they are afforded the opportunity in the 
dictator game.  There was also no correlation between whether the subjects 
believed that the distribution of wealth in South Africa was fair and their actual 
offers in the dictator game (see Appendix A, Table 16).  This reinforces the 
conclusion that those who say that they are in favour of redistribution are not 
necessarily those who carry it out.  This highlights the inadequacy of relying 
solely on surveys to capture individuals’ attitudes and preferences towards 
redistribution. 
 
Finally, in order to analyse the effectiveness of the experiments in eliciting more 
accurate responses than would have been done by a survey alone, the recipients 
of the dictator games were asked to make a hypothetical offer to an imaginary 
partner.  The mean of these offers was R17.11 (or 43% of the pie) compared to 
the mean in the actual experiment of R12.90 (or 32% of the pie).  The difference 
between the two means is significant at the 1% level (see Appendix A, Table 
17). This suggests strongly that responses to hypothetical situations in a survey 
overestimate the amounts that people will actually give in a real situation. 
 
Frohlich et al. (2000) argued that experimental results would be affected by any 
doubt in the minds of the experimental subjects as to the design of the 
experiment and the existence of the other players.  A question was inserted into 
the questionnaire to analyse if there existed any doubt in the minds of the 
students regarding the experiments.  Almost half of the students answered that 
they believed that everything that they were told about the experimental design 
was true.  The other half felt that most of what they were told was the truth.  
Therefore the experiments were effective in terms of the lack of doubt on behalf 
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of the students and the experimental results were therefore not invalidated by the 





The experimental results provide evidence of altruistic behaviour amongst the 
sample of university students, as exhibited by the mean offers in the dictator 
experiment.  The students behave more generously when the deservingness of 
the recipient of the offer is accentuated.  The students are more willing to give to 
those who they feel need it more than they do.  This generosity is reduced when 
the person feels that they have rightfully earned their money.  This is seen in the 
fact that the mean offer in the status treatment is significantly lower than that in 
the random treatment.  This implies that people are more unwilling to give 
money away when they have worked for it or earned it in one way or another. 
However the analysis, when broken down into demographic details, did not 
provide any significant results. Although this may seem surprising, why would 
we think that a student sample would be any different to each other in their 
generosity?  It provides evidence for the argument that the new generation of 
South African students behave in a similar manner when faced with the dictator 
game, regardless of race or gender. 
 
The analysis of the survey results reveals that the students in the sample are, in 
general, in favour of redistribution.  They view the government as being 
primarily responsible for addressing redistribution, although no one felt that the 
government was doing a good job.  There was little correlation between those 
individuals who expressed a desire for redistribution and their actual giving 
behaviour in the experiment.  This may be because individuals do not feel it is 
their role to redistribute wealth.  These results suggest that surveys aimed at 
eliciting preferences on redistribution are inadequate on their own, as there may 
be a divergence between what people say and what they actually do.  
Nevertheless, it does seem to imply the sample of students were unwilling to 
follow through with their expressed desires for redistribution when the occasion 
arises, but rather they give out of some feeling of sympathy for their fellow 
student or for the sake of being “fair”. 
 
Overall, it seems that the students in the sample do have a common 
understanding in terms of their giving behaviour and their altruistic motivations.  
There are many examples of altruistic behaviour in South Africa. One only 




of many South Africans and foreigners.  There is no reason to pay a car guard 
for his services, he is not authorised by any official body to protect your car, and 
he lives on donations alone.  Yet people feel compelled consistently to give 
money to these strangers.  
 
South Africa faces a deteriorating situation where redistribution does not appear 
to be happening fast enough and the promises of the government are not being 
kept. The majority of the participants understand the need for redistribution and 
the results of this research indicate that people are willing to redistribute.  
However this compulsion is tempered when they feel that they have earned the 
right to a greater share of the resources.  At the same time, when people feel that 
the recipient of their charity is deserving, they are more willing to help that 
person out with a donation.  These two conflicting impulses provide a clue as to 
the reason for the current slow pace of redistribution. 
 
There are many ways in which this study could be taken further. The lack of 
funding meant that only students could be used for these experiments.  A more 
accurate understanding of the South African public would require that 
experiments such as these are performed on a wider scale.  Even if this was not 
possible, a larger sample size is needed to obtain more significant results.  It 
would be preferable that the questionnaire is administered several weeks before 
the experiment.  The size of the pie given to the dictators should be varied to see 
if this has any effect on their giving behaviour.  It would also be interesting if 
the dictators were given some information about the person they were sending to 
and how this altered their giving behaviour.  Another avenue for future research 
is to compare these results to a double-blind dictator game, but with almost 
exactly the same instructions, to see if the giving behaviour of the dictators 
significantly changed.  This research should be viewed as the first step in the 
direction of conducting more experiments to investigate social questions in 
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Table 5: ANOVA Table: Mean Offers by Treatment 
 
 Sum of Squares df    Mean
Square 
F Sig.
Between Groups 1347.726 2 673.863 
Within Groups 6219.464 76 81.835 
8.234 .001 
Total 7567.190 78    
 
 
Table 6: Mann-Whitney Test – Status treatment 
 
Ranks 
treatment  N Mean 
Rank 
Sum of Ranks 
Anonymous 25 30.18 754.50 
Status 26 21.98 571.50 















Table 7: Mann-Whitney Test – Financial Aid Treatment 
 
Ranks 
Treatment  N Mean 
Rank 
Sum of Ranks 
Anonymous 25 23.64 591.00 
Financial aid 28 30.00 840.00 



















Table 8: ANOVA Table: Mean Offers by Gender 
 
 Sum of Squares df    Mean
Square 
F Sig.
Between Groups 155.614 1 155.614 
Within Groups 7411.576 77 96.254 
1.617 .207 
Total 7567.190 78    
 
 
Table 9: Mean Offers by Race 
 
Race group Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
African 12.0 27 9.3 
White 11.9 33 9.7 
Coloured 13.2 14 7.8 
Indian 26.3 4 16.0 
Asian 10.0 1 . 
Total 12.9 79 9.9 
 
 
Table 10: ANOVA Table: Table: Mean Offers by Race 
 
 Sum of Squares df    Mean
Square 
F Sig.
Between Groups 773.241 4 193.310 
Within Groups 6793.949 74 91.810 
2.106 .089 





 26  
Table 11: ANOVA Table: Table: Mean Offers by Income 
 
 Sum of Squares df    Mean
Square 
F Sig.
Between Groups 948.720 4 237.180 
Within Groups 6618.470 74 89.439 
2.652 0.040 
Total 7567.190 78    
 
 
Table 12: ANOVA Table: Mean Offers by Home Language 
 
 Sum of Squares df    Mean
Square 
F Sig.
Between Groups 911.760 10 91.176 
Within Groups 6655.430 68 97.874 
.932 .510 
Total 7567.190 78    
 
 
Table 13: ANOVA Table: Mean Offers by Religious Affiliation 
 
 Sum of Squares df    Mean
Square 
F Sig.
Between Groups 1188.623 8 148.578 
Within Groups 6378.567 70 91.122 
1.631 .132 
Total 7567.190 78    
 
 
Table 14: ANOVA Table: Mean Offers by Course of Study 
 
 Sum of Squares df    Mean
Square 
F Sig.
Between Groups 982.039 9 109.115 
Within Groups 6585.150 69 95.437 
1.143 .345 






Table 15: Correlations Between Offer Amount and Survey Response 
(Willingly Give Money to Uplift Others) 
 
  offer amount willing giving 
offer amount Pearson Correlation 1.000 .005 
 Sig. (2-tailed) . .965 
 N 79 79 
willing giving Pearson Correlation .005 1.000 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .965 . 
 N 79 79 
 
 
Table 16: Correlations Between Offer Amount and Survey Response 
(Redistribution) 
 
  offer amount new distribution 
ques 
offer amount Pearson Correlation 1.000 .132 
 Sig. (2-tailed) . .246 
 N 79 79 
distribution 
ques 
Pearson Correlation .132 1.000 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .246 . 
 N 79 79 
 
 
Table 17: Paired Samples Test, Hypothetical Offers versus Experimental 
Offers 
 
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 





Pair 1 offer amount 
- Player B's 
hypothetical 
offer 
-4.08 12.27 1.43 -6.92 -1.124 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire used in the Experiments 
 
 
Questionnaire for Player A 
 
 
1. Player identification number:  _________________ 
 
2. Age:  ___________________ 
 
3. Sex:     Male     Female      (circle one) 
 
4. Race Group: (circle one)  African     White     Coloured     Indian      Asian     
 
 Other (specify)____________________ 
 
5. Home Language: 
 
6. How many years have you been at University?  _________ 
 
7. Current Year of Study:  _____________________________ 
 
8. Course of study:  ___________________________________ 
 
9. Majors:  __________________________________________ 
 
10. What religion do you belong to?   (circle one) 
 
Christian Moslem Jewish Hindu Buddhist Atheist 
                           
  Other (specify) ____________________________ 
 
11. How often do you attend religious ceremonies?  (circle one) 
 
Daily Weekly Monthly A few times a 
year 
Barely ever Never 
 
12. Thinking about your own or your family’s financial situation, do you consider yourself to be: 
 
i) Rich 
ii) Upper income 
iii) Middle income 
iv) Lower income 
v) Poor 
 








The following questions should be answered as honestly as possible. They are simply a matter of 
opinion, i.e. no answer is right or wrong. We simply wish to gauge your responses on a number of 
issues. In each case, please circle your answer. 
 
14. The Progressive tax system (i.e. a system of tax where richer individuals are taxed more than 
poorer individuals through tax brackets) is seen as one method of redistributing wealth from the 




iii) Don’t know/have no opinion 
 
Below is a list of 6 individuals. We would like you to do the following: In Column B, please indicate 
how much money you would give each of them if they were the person you were paired with in the 
experiment. In each case, imagine that you have been given R40 to split. In Column C, we would like 
you to make a guess as to how much each of these individuals would give, if they were Player A who 
had R40 to split.  
  
Individual Column B: How much 
would you give to this 
person? 
Column C: Ranking 
Greg Smith, a young male in his early 
twenties.  
Out of R40, I would 
give him R………. 
Out of R40, he would 
give R…… to Player B. 
Thandi Mzikwa, a middle aged woman.  Out of R40, I would 
give her R………. 
Out of R40, she would 
give R…… to Player B. 
Simpiwe Ndlovu, a UCT student Out of R40, I would 
give her R………. 
Out of R40, she would 
give R…… to Player B. 
Nasser Abrahams, a wealthy business man.  Out of R40, I would 
give him R………. 
Out of R40, he would 
give R…… to Player B. 
Chantel du Toit, a young unemployed single 
mother 
Out of R40, I would 
give her R………. 
Out of R40, she would 
give R…… to Player B. 
Johannes van Rensburg, a Dutch Reformed 
Church minister.  
Out of R40, I would 
give him R………. 
Out of R40, he would 
give R…… to Player B. 
 
 
15. What do you think about income inequality in South Africa? 
 
i) There will always be the rich and the poor in any society, and South Africa is no different. 
ii) Income inequality is not a serious problem in South Africa 
iii) Income inequality is a problem but not as much as people make out 
iv) South Africa has one of the worst income inequality problems in the world, which is 
v) something that should be dealt with urgently 
vi) I don’t have an opinion on this issue 
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i) The government is doing very well, they are closing the gap between the rich and poor 
quite quickly 
ii) The government is working hard on the problem, it just needs time and patience 
iii) The government has been completely ineffective in solving the income inequality 
problem. 
iv) I don’t have an opinion on this issue 
 
17. Do you think that the South African government should help the poor, or do you think it is up to 
the poor to help themselves? 
 
i) Poor should help themselves 
ii) Government should help the poor 
iii) Don’t know 
iv) Don’t care 
 




ii) Private charities 
iii) The government 
iv) The families and relatives of the poor 
v) The poor themselves 
vi) Other   
(please say who you think this should be_________________________________) 
 
19. Do you think that the distribution of money and wealth in South Africa today is fair, or do you 
think that the money and wealth in South Africa should be more evenly distributed among a larger 
percentage of the people? 
 
i) The current distribution of money and wealth is fair 
ii) The wealth and money should be more evenly distributed among a larger percentage of  
people. 
iii) Don’t know 
 
20. Which one of the views expressed below do you most agree with? Circle the one you most agree 
with. 
 
i) There is plenty of opportunity in South Africa, and anyone who works hard can get far. 
ii) There is not much opportunity in South Africa, and the average person doesn’t have much 
chance to get far even if they work hard. 
 
21. South Africa is sometimes described as a country of “Haves” (people who have money and live 
well) and “Have-nots (people who are poor and struggle for the basic necessities in life). Which of 










22. What do you think about the recent land seizures in Zimbabwe? 
 
i) It is about time Mugabe took the land back from the colonists 
ii) It is something that needed to happen, it just happened in the wrong way 
iii) The seizure of private property without compensation breaks one of the fundamental 
human rights, and should be punished as such 
iv) I don’t have an opinion on this issue 
 
23. Do you think the same situation of “land-grabbing” will arise in South Africa in the near future? 
 
i) Not at all likely 
ii) It is a possibility that should not be ignored 
iii) Very likely 
iv) I don’t know 
 
24. If you had the opportunity to uplift a family that you have never seen or known by sacrificing 
some of your present/future income, would you do it? 
 
i) Only if I knew that the family was deserving of charity 
ii) Only if it was a small proportion of my total income 
iii) I would willingly give money to uplift others 
iv) I would never give money to people I do not know 
v) I don’t have an opinion on this issue 
 
 
These last few questions are about the actual experiment.  
 
25. Do you think the experiment was staged, or do you believe that everything that the monitors told 
you was true? 
 
i) Everything we were told was the truth 
ii) Most of what we were told was the truth 
iii) There are actually no other students in the other lecture venue 
iv) The monitors lied to us to get us to behave in strange ways 
 
26. Why did you give the amount of money you did to Player B? 
 
i) It seemed the most fair offer to make 
ii) I chose to play strategically 
iii) I needed to keep the money for my own enjoyment 
iv) I gave what I felt I needed to give 
v) I don’t know why I gave what I gave 
 
27. Would you have given more money to Player B if you had known who they were?     
 
 Yes      No    (circle one) 
 
28. Would you have given more money to Player B if all the participants in the experiment (including 
the Player B’s) had known how much you were sending to Player B?  
 
Yes           No   (circle one) 
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29. Would you have given more money to Player B if you had known that he/she needed the money 
far more than you do?  
 




Thank you for your participation in this experiment, you will now be paid for participation. 
